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1.. We 
wot c rcicjLiiisCcd to ur\dcirl.Ko h ^t.udy wit 1*1 t hfci following 
i ./* basic objectives.— 
(a) To provide the basis on which the subject of Caribbean/ 
Latin American relations would guide discussion and future action; 
(b) To trace the historical background with a view to 
identifying those social, historical and cultural factors of relevance 
to a better mutual understanding such as: 
(i) cultural, including language, religion, 
institutional diife»ences and approaches; 
(11) ethnic origins and their significance for 
extra-regional links; 
(c) To identify .those economic factors capable of stimulating 
greater economic activity between both groups, recognising differences 
in territorial size, levels of development and resource endowments; 
k>-
(d) To analyse the geo-political situation bearing in mind 
^ the special features of island developing states and the existence of 
territorial disputes; 
(e) To study the history and growth of the relationships 
between the two sub-groups as it has evolved since the achievement of 
independence by CARICOM states, identifying difficulties which have 
arisen in both bilateral and multilateral relations; 
(f) To study the existing pattern of extra-regional relations 
(political, economic, cultural) of the two sub-groups, including 
importantly, the role of Latin American and/or Caribbean states in 
the United Nations System nd in such interregional organizations 
as the Non-Alligned Move; .it, the Group of 77, the ACP Group and 
the Commonwealth and th impact of such extra-regional relations 
between the two groups; 
V Footnoies to text may bo found on page 50. 
(g) To atudy the workings oí regionuJ organizations such as ECLA, 
OAS, SELA, GEPLACEA, OLADE in which both groups participate; 
(h) To recommend new strategies and i^nats for the elimination of 
identified difficulties and for the further development and management of 
Caribbean relations with Latin America at both bilateral and multilateral 
levels; 
(i) To identify areas of complementarity and mutual interest towards 
the formulation of projects which can be undertaken by Caribbean and Latin 
American states within the framework of ECLA and specifically the CDCC 
and other regional organizations such aw SELA and the OAS. 
2. After some discussion it was agreed that the focus on economic aspects 
would be limited in the light of ongoing work (referred to below) by other 
ECLA subregional offices and the CARICOM Secretariat. 
3. The idea of an examination of the state of the relations between 
Caribbean and Latin American countries and the call for a study of this 
matter came out of a concern felt in the Caribbean, and also in the Economic 
Commission for Latin America, that positive steps needed to be taken to 
put these relations on a sounder basis. 
4. Since the commissioning of the study two issues have emerged which have 
. ignifleant implications for Caribbean/Latin American relations. 
iLrat in,the Malvinas/Falkland Islands affair, and the conflict between 
0ent:lna and Britain. The positions taken by the CARICOM countries, 
auci m e reaction to this on the pa r. of some in Latin America served, among 
other things, to bring into the oyen some of the deep differences which 
exist and some of the misunderstandings and misperceptions. This situation 
has more than confirmed the need for a close study of the relations between 
Caribbean and Latin American com? 1es, and for appropriate action to 
improve these relations. 
6. The Caribbean Basin Initio ive constitutes an attempt to establish 
special economic relationships between the countries of the Caribbean and 
Central America and the United States, f ncerns in the region centre 
11 v • - - - 'Xf]usion of sarip fix • •<••!(.s in the Caribbean Basin 
from the programme, and I e.i r •, -.1 <M<I I. IK- possible no.gai ive effects 
of the programme on ef I 01 i\s t ow.n d i Im-.e economic relations between 
Caribbean Basin countries ind Latin America. 
7. The study has been carried out mainly from a Caribbean perspec-
tive. In this, and other respects, it must be seen as a preliminary 
exercise, indicating major issues, enlarging on some and pointing 
to further areas of enquiry, exploration or action. Parallel to 
this study, work is being undertaken by the offices of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America In Kogoia-^ and Mexico Clty^ and this 
will provide a valuable basis for the consideration of practical 
measures toward more effective economic co-operation between Latin 
American and Caribbean count rles. Jn addition, we understand, a team 
from the Caribbean Community Secretariat lias recently visited the 
Headquarters of the Andean Part for discussions on economic relations. 
8. The report, while drawing attention to differences and 
difficulties In relations, J ¿t wt li ten in full awareness of the many 
areas and instances of healthy relations and co-operation between 
Caribbean and Latin American countries. At the same time, it is 
recognized that, there are special and sensitive elements, such as 
cultural and ethnic factors, and extra-regional relations, which 
have a strong bearing-on the issues being examined in the study and 
out "Purpose here is to try to ensure that they are faced in 
responsible, frank and constructive manner. 
9. It is clear that while the two groups of countries have many 
common interests, there are major differences between them. Some of 
these are real others are the product of lack of information or of 
misunderstandings. In any event geography imposes on these 
countries the necessity to find the most satisfactory relationships. 
It is, then, the effective management of these relationships 
that requires attention and action. 
D.O. Hills 
V.A. Lewis 
T U K J _ M _ S T O L < L C A I , _HAC : I <J . ,KOI ;NU 
1. There can he no doubt chat many of the relationships that 
now exist between the Caribbean countries and Latin America are 
rooted in the history of each ot these groups of countries, and in 
the manner of their emergence as independent states. For the purposes 
of this study ft will only be possible to touch briefly on some of 
the main factors here, and to suggest the ways in which they have 
facilitated co-operative relationships, or have inhibited them. 
2. Each ot the two groups at one time formed part ol one of the 
great empires established by conquest by Western European powers; 
and each still bears the marks and influences of that experience. Each 
group expresses in its won way the characteristic ambivalence toward 
the former metropolitan centre (or the block of countries with which 
i t is associated) the renentment at. the d iwadvantageB which they 
feel still exist, particularly in economic relations, and the positive 
sentiments based on the long-standing cultural connections. 
3. While such negative feelings in some instances provide a basis 
for solidarity between the two groups, again on some international 
econouic issues, the remaining links ot sentiment and real contact 
with each metropolit4n centre g.lve rise to differences and diffi-
culties between Latin American and Caribbean countries, and to 
serious misunderstanding. 
4. Latin American countries gained their independence in most 
cases in the early nineteenth century. Their struggle for indepen-
dence, involving military campaigns, and a strong sense of 
unity against a common opponent, as expressed for example in the 
exploits of such figures as Simon Bolivar, helped to create the 
feeling'of Latin American solidarity and a sense of joint destiny. 
Thus it is felt In Latin America that Bolivar's concept of a 
Latin American league of nations laid the foundations of the Pan 
American movement. 
5. Spain maintained 11 a hold < >n .span i .sit Amei i IM I <»r 300 veai w. Yet all 
of these colonies were 1 i.berated in a |n*i iod ol t j t , n years between 
.1810 and 1825 - all, that is, except Cuba and Puerto Rii_o. The contrast 
has been drawn between North America where 1''<J thiiieen Engiish 
colonies became one independent state, the United States of America; and 
Spanish America where seventeen separate republics emerged from the wars 
of liberation. This is attributed to the great diversity in cultural, 
ethnic and other characteristics, in Spanish America, the nature of the 
colonial administrations, and obstacles deriving irom geography and 
terrain which greatly inhibited transport and communication between the 
territories. 
6. it has been stated thai the emancipation o) Spanish America "marked 
a further stage in the shift from a Mediterranean to an Atlantic civiliza-
tion, and opened an enormous region lo trade and immigration..."- "...it-
brought into existence a number ol: new states which thereafter would have 
to be taken into account, by statesmen in other parts of the world in 
4/ the conduct of diplomacy and strategy . 
7. Who are the people of Latin Amei tea? To begin, there are the 
original indigenous populations - the Indians - who in spite of the. 
harsh impact of the conquest on them, remain as a significant element 
in many countries. Much visible evidence ol the unique cultures of some 
oi these peoples exists. 
8. But the settlement of Europeans belore and after the liberation of 
Latin America ensured the predominance of that element in much oJ the 
region in cultural, social, political and economic terms. This tact 
must have a considerable influence on Lhe way in which the people of 
these countries see themselves, on tlie.ti relations with the rest of the 
world, and, of course, on their perceptions ot: and attitudes toward the 
Caribbean group ot. countries. 
9. The complexity of the ethnic and cultural situation is increased by-
reason of the existence ol sign it J cant numbers ot people ot African origin 
in many Latin American countries - the descendants of slaves, or of 
immigrants from the Caribbean. The posit ion that these groups occupy in 
Laliu Amei J in 'ountries undoubted I y <ihu has a bearing on the 
perception in i h»"»e cunt i i of tlie Caribbean, where tiie 
majority of the population, aie 01. African origin. 
10. This of. course, is not a static situation, as the mixing 
of the races along with other influences, have been associated in 
some Latin American countries, with an evolving set of attitudes 
in the matter of race relations and the like. How Latin American 
societies evolve in the future in the face of this complex cul-
tural and ethnic situation, how they cope in political, economic 
and other terms with the pressures and demands emanating from this 
situation which will inevitably grow more insistent, will be of 
considerable consequence to relations within the region - not 
the least to the relation« between these countries and the Carib-
bean. 
1 1 . Haiti occupies a unique position in the history o f Latin 
America. That Caribbean country fought a successful war of 
liberation against the forces o1 Napoleon, and in 1804 became 
the first Latin American country to achieve independence. This 
country so different from the rest of Latin America, in its 
experience with French colonial power, and Its predominantly 
African population played an important role in the liberation o f 
the region. Simon Bolivar, after his period of exile in Jamaica, 
went to Haiti as did other Spanish American patriot refugees, 
where he received assistance from the President of Haiti toward 
the equipping of his expeditionary force for the final effort of 
liberation. 
12. Spanish and Portuguese are the main languages of Latin 
America, and this constitutes a vital cultural link between the 
countries of the region and with Spain and Portugal. 
13. The efforts to replace the political and administrative 
machinery of Spain after the liberation of Latin America, and to 
preserve the democratic traditions which invested the liberation 
movements, have not been universally successful. Latin America 
presents a picture oi. a great, variety of political systems and 
institutions, and continues to experience political changes and 
.1 4 
upheavals In many lasts. Few oi the . xiniiirs today die democracies. 
14. A number of clear differences between tin Caribbean countries and Ldtin 
America have emerged from these difteient historical processes. 
15. The Caribbean English-speaking countries have had a much longer 
experience as colonies, and were the subject or conquest and re-conquest 
in the rivalries between the Western powers. At one time these countries 
occupied a position of great importance In the economic and strategic 
systems of the European powers. in addition to the skirmishes and open 
wars which affected the area as these powers sought, to gain or retain possess-
ion of particular"territories, the area was subject to a series of 
upheavals as the slaves, brought in large numbers 1. i om Af rica, rebelled against 
their masters and fought against the forces of the Government which 
supported the system of slavery. 
16. These Caribbea tr countries achieved independence mainly in the 1960s — 
on tire basis of political agitation and negotiation. Thus for them 
independence came in an era and in a manner quite different from those in 
which the liberation of Latin America took place. in the case ot the 
v Caribbean countries their relations with the metropolitan power went 
through a fundamental change once the claim to independence was established 
and conceded. Thus for these countries there was a period of "tutelage", a 
learning period in which constitutional changes and other events gradually 
led up to the point of full independence. 
17. Again, during that period, major social and other changes took place, 
changes arising out of the growing social and political consciousness oi 
the people, and resulting in the emergence into political prominence and 
leadership positions, before independence, ot individuals and groups 
representative of the mass ot the populations. The contrast in this respect 
with Latin America is clear. 
18. The effort to form a Federation embracing these countries before 
their achievement of independence, proved abortive. But the operationalisa-
tion of the concept of a Caribbean Free Trade Association followed by the 
* establishment of the Caribbean Community have been important factors over 
the past thirty to forty years - in the relations between these countries, 
and in tlie way that they are seen by others, including Latin America. 
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19. By reason of the manner and timing of their emergence into 
independence, they have retained special relationships with the 
United Kingdom, and this too has had a significant effect on their 
relations with Latin America. 
20. And who are the people of the Caribbean? Except in the main-
land countries - Guyana and Belize - the indigenous Indian populations 
"disappeared1' rapidly after the conquest of the territories. Little 
trace of their existence remains except in simple artifacts unearthed 
in a few locations. The present populations consist in the main, of 
descendants of the relatively small numbers of settlers from the 
United Kingdom, the large numbers of African s.laves who were 
transported to the area, and the people from India and elsewhere 
who came later as indenture labour, or otherwise. The Caribbean 
therefore presents a very different picture from Latin America in 
this respect. 
21. The language of the area is English, with traces of French 
in those countries once held by France. The late development of 
universities in the Caribbean is an important point of difference 
between the Caribbean and Latin America. It meant, for example, 
that opportunities for higher education, for the pursuit of rigorous 
research and training based in the foundations of the cultural and 
social and other aspects of the community, came very late. Scholars 
from the Caribbean had to pursue such training in universities in 
North America and Britain, thus further reinforcing links with 
those countries. Even today there is very little contact between 
scholars from the two groups of countries, and apparently very 
little in the research and curricula of their universities and 
schools that relates to each other's history and circumstances. 
22. Here, and in other respects, the language difference is a 
potent factor. The Caribbean countries long before indepei dence 
established their political systems on the basis of the Westminster 
model of parliamentary democracy. The complex of institutions within 
and outside of the governmental sphere, and the play of public 
discussion, all form elements in this, system and represent unique 
i 
features of Caribbean lite. In spite ol major changes and 
serious difficulties, this pattern remains largely in place. It has profound 
effects on the ways in which Caribbean countries perceive themselves, and on 
their political relations with other communities, including the Latin 
American countries. 
23. Caribbean English-speaking countries have made significant impacts on 
communities outside, including some distant ones. This has resulted from 
the unique history and other circumstances of the countries, their demographic 
composition, and among other factors the necessity of a search for freedom 
and wider opportunities inside and outside their borders, following the 
confining experience of hundreds of years of slavery and colonisation. 
There has been, over a long period, a small but very significant 
movement of people from the Caribbean to Africa and this along with the work 
and writings of Marcus Garvey, George Padmore and others has had a 
profound impact on that continent - in particular West African countries. 
Here must be mentioned also the work of Frantz Fanon, a product of the 
Caribbean also; in this case, the French-speaking area. 
24. In the earlier years of the twentieth century, there was considerable 
migration from the Caribbean to a number of Latin American countries, 
notably Pamama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Cuba, Ecuador, Venezuela. The 
descendants of these migrants still live in those countries, in many 
instances regarding themselves and being regarded as ''Caribbean" peoples, 
retaining their original language and customs. This movement has had some 
positive effects in terms of increasing contacts and information between 
the two groups of countries. But these effects appear to have been rather 
limited. One must wonder what perceptions have existed by reason of this -
of Latin America - and of the Caribbean respectively. 
25. Migration of Caribbean peoples to the United States has had important 
effects, notably in the light of the large population of Blacks in that 
country. The same is true of migration to Britain, although in this case it 
is the flow of emigrants from the Caribbean, from Africa and from Asia 
in the past three decades which has been converting that former centre of 
a great empire into a multi-racial society. 
In the case of both countries the presence of emigrants and their 
descendants has sharpened the focus of attention on the Caribbean. 
26. The factor of. size <.oul.il be another important one in the 
perceptions, and in the relations between the Caribbean and Latin 
America. The latter group contains a number of countries very large 
in physical size and in population. Moreover, in respect of some 
commodities, their output is large indeed. This contrasts sharply 
with the small Caribbean countries, with their seriously limited 
material and human resource bases. 
27. It would seem then, that there are basic and very significant 
differences between Latin America and the Caribbean in ethnic, 
cultural, political and institutional terms, and in size; and 
that these differences along with the lack of adequate contact 
and exchange between the two groups of countries present real 
difficulties in the way of pursuing collaborative relationships. 
These, and the perceptions by each group of the other, require close 
understanding if relations are to be placed on a firmer and more 
effective basis. 
THE GEO-POLITICAL SITUATION 
28. The long political and economic relationships of the English-
speaking Caribbean countries with Europe, in particular the United 
Kingdom, the extreme dependence of the countries on these relationships 
for their viability, and the cultural and educational (information) 
Impact of the relationship, have not disposed the people of these 
countries to think of themselves as being part of the American 
Continental Zone, This has meant, that at the level of policy, little 
thought has been given to the question of the political and economic 
Implications of geographical location, especially as these relate 
to the countries of South and Central America. 
29. Problems of territorial jurisdiction have Imposed upon certain 
states - Trinidad and Tobago, Belize - the necessity to divert 
technical and diplomatic expertise to immediate problem-solving 
with South and Central American neighbours. But the necessity 
to elaborate strategies for long term relationships with countries 
in most cases physically larger, more populous, and wealthier 
than themselves, has not been perceived as urgent. 
30. Thus even the much heralded diversification of international 
relationships, undertaken by some of these Caribbean Community 
countries in the 196Qs and 1970s, can be said to have related more 
to -the countries of Africa and Asia and less to those of the South 
and Central Zones. This has of course, been partly because the 
South and Central American states as a whole have not been active 
participants in the programme of the Non-Aligned Movement, the main 
non-Western institutionalised International forum in which CARICOM 
states have been diplomatically active. 
31. As the CARICOM states have had experience of independence, they 
have begun to take cognisance of a variety of pressures emanating 
from the South-Central American Zone, and from the non-Anglophone 
Caribbean environment. These pressures have induced some recognition 
of the need for elaborating longer term strategies. Even problems 
of territorial jurisdiction requiring immediate responses, are 
seen t_o have wider imp I leat 1ous Mian i IK mere Lei r i.u>i. ial. I n etlect, t hese 
implications speak to questions of adjustment to neighbouring states with 
whom there have historically been limited relationships, and from full 
contact with whom they have hitherto been protected or prohibited by the 
colonial power. 
32. The Guyana/Venezuela attempts to resolve their territorial controversy, 
when linked to Guyana's territorial difficulties with Suriname, and Brazil's 
interest in ensuring stability of boundaries in her environment, indicate 
that what is here posed even if territorial questions were resolved, is the 
problem of the progressive working out ot a nexus of diplomatic and func-
tional relationships between a ser oi states - some new, some older - of 
the Northern-South American area. The differences in economic and or 
population size, and physical endowments, oe.tween Guyana and Suriname 
(physically large states by CARICOM standards) on the one hand, and 
Venezuela and Brazil on the other, ^erve to suggest that some of the histori-
cal characterisitcs in the relations between major and minor powers will of 
necessity come into play. And the sense of the development of a new arena 
of international relations is enhanced by the apparent desire of another 
Northern-South American state, Colombia, to engage itself in the Caribbean 
area. 
33. Much the same might be said of the territorial difficulties between 
Guatemala and Belize. Here it seems, the recognition by Belize of the 
political and economic implications of. geographical location, is greater 
than in most other CARICOM states. it is clear that even while being a 
full member-state of the Caribbean Community Belize will be engaged, even 
after the territorial dispute has been resolved, in developing a rnage of 
diplomatic and economic relationships with the countries of Central America 
and with the major regional state of Mexico. Such relationships will evolve 
irrespective of differences in the nature of regimes, and in the ideologies of 
regimes, as between Belize and the other states, though these factors will 
undoubtedly qualify the relationships. 
34. Inevitably, as these relationships between CARICOM members on the 
continental mainland and their neighbours develop, there will be sensitivities 
on the part of the CARICOM group. On the other hand the mainland states 
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(Belize, Guyana), bound c u l t u r a l l y and in part economically to 
the Caribbean Community and the. Common Market, have shown indications 
of perceiving the CARICOM system as a possible diplomatic counterweight; 
and as a channel through which wider relationships can be maintained 
between themselves as small states, and states In other geo-political 
zones. For there now seems also to be a perception among some of 
the larger mainland states, that some virtue exists In having 
systematic relationships In addition to those in the Hemisphere in 
which the United States is the constant and dominant partner. 
35. Another area in which the CARICOM states have come to an 
awareness of the developing significance ot the South American mainland 
for themselves, is that relating to the Law of the Sea. Most of the 
CARICOM countries, as island-states, have some to independence during 
the course of the negotiations In the United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Given their existence In a small semi-
enclosed sea, the CARICOM states, even if they had the technological 
s capability for taking complete advantage of a two-hundred-mile 
economic zone declaration, would be unable to do so, as a regult of 
their close proximity to each other. 
36. On the other hand, most of them have not looked with particular 
favour on the two-hundred-mile economic zone or territorial sea 
extension of south American coastal states, as this has affected their 
own customary fisheries activities. The agreements signed between 
Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil in 1972, and Barbados and Brazil in 
1973, are indicative of the problem here. In turn the island-states' 
own CARICOM mainland partner, Guyana, anxious to be In no less 
favoured a situation than Brazil and others, has herself sought to. 
impose restrictions and ensure rights for herself similar to theirs. 
Again this has affected the island-states traditional activities. 
37. The largest of the Island states, Jamaica, has within the 
UNCLOS context characterised herself as a 'Zone-locked' state, this 
concept focussing on the difference in situation and therefore 
interest between herself and the South and Central American states 
- 11 -
which have generally followed the two-hundred-mile principle. Jamaica has 
recently succeeded, after much effort, in negotiating a fisheries 
agreement with Colombia which will protect the activities of her fishermen 
in areas claimed by Colombia, partly as a consequence of her ownership 
of islands in the Caribbean Sea itself. 
38. The urgency of the situation created by the UNCLOS negotiations has 
been brought home to many of the smaller island-states in the Caribbean 
Community by the active desire of Venezuela to delimit her own territorial 
sea and economic zone areas. Apart from the fact that two-hundred-mile 
economic zone extension gives Venezuela an extensive presence in the semi-
enclosed Caribbean sea, her activity has forced other countries, including 
the United States and France (by virtue of their possession of territories 
in the area), to pursue their own delimitations vis-^-vis the Caribbean 
countries. In addition, the Venezuelan ownership of Aves Island in the 
vicinity of the North-eastern Caribbean, has brought the smaller island-
states into a somewhat unanticipated relationship with that country. It 
might be noted in passing, that the various delimitations in the Caribbean 
Sea have negated the Jamaican attempt to ensure a wider stake in the sea 
for herself, through the proposal that the Caribbean be accepted as a 
"matrimonial sea". 
39. Venezuela's active presence in the Caribbean Sea in the course of UNCLOS, 
has simply highlighted a previously existing assertion of national interest 
encompassing•both economic and security components. The country actually 
possesses the longest coastline of any state in the Caribbean. Her 
geophysical and economic (petroleum) relationship with the Leeward Islands 
of the Netherlands Antilles, has already induced her to take an interest 
in the political viability of those entities. 
40. Then the nature of her petroleum trade with the United States and her 
general trade with the North Atlantic countries, has led Venezuela to 
perceive the Caribbean as a gateway to that area. Post-1959 antipathies 
between Cuba and herself have reinforced this concern. 
41. It is, of course, within this general context that Venezuela's 
demonstrations of interest in the CAR.LC0M Windward and Leeward Islands 
must be seen; even at a time when, on the road to independence, they were 
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still technically colonies, as Associated States of the United Kingdom. 
That active interest of one northern Semen ueUHtfj« n^s, 
we have indicated above, spurred £he interest cjngt{]e£, Gc^ £)iji|>ia. 
It can be anticipated that these interests fee W8F® 
actively in the foreseeable future. 
42. The material reflection of the cei]Ggrji of the major regional 
mainland countries in the vicinity of thg Cgfi|?bean, in the political 
and economic stability of the CARICOM states, has been their 
adherence, as important contributing members, to the Caribbean 
Development Bank (CDB); and their establishment of the San Jose 
Accord oil facility, designed to ease the financial consequences for 
the Caribbean (andCentral American) states of the dramatic increase in 
petroleum prices. 
This institutionalisation of concern and national interest 
indicates, once again, the long-term nature of the relationship in 
which the CARICOM countries will be involved; as distinct from 
relationships consequent upon the necessity to immediately resolve 
colonial-legacy type problems, or to urgently implement law of the 
sea agreements. 
43. We turn from the wider so-called Caribbean Basin area encompas-
sing the states or the mainland bordering the Caribbean Sea, to the 
area whose centre is the archipelago chain itself. We refer to the 
archipelago plus the historically connected mainland territories of 
the Guyanas and Belize. This is the area encompassing CARICOM, but 
defined in recent times by the composition of the Caribbean Development 
and Co-operation Committee (CDCC) formed in 1975. 
44. We need not concern ourselves with the motivation for the 
formation for the CDCC, although we might say that there has been 
a concern among the Caribbean political leadership, since the demise 
of Federation of the West Indies, for some degree of institutionali-
sing of relations between the groupings in the archipelago formerly 
dominated by a variety of colonial jurisdictions. 
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45. The counterposing of the two formulations CARICOM - CDCC indicates 
however that the geo-political problem here is that of the incomplete 
diplomatic coherence of intra-Caribbean relations. The problem is 
indicated by the attempts of both Haiti and the Dominican Republic to 
establish some form of relationship with CARICOM, and the continuing 
difficulties in arranging mechanisms that are satisfactory to all the parties. 
Further, the 'normalisation' of relations with Cuba, which the CARICOM 
countries thought themselves to be achieving in the early 1970s, has not 
come to fruition; though it is of course well known that this has been, and 
is complicated by the larger problem of Cuba-United States relations. 
46. That the historical patterns of trade and cultural relationships are 
not such as to have brought the CARICOM states on the one hand, and Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic on the other, into close proximity, is only part 
of the problem. That the competition for American sugar quotas may 
increase rather than decrease political distance, is also only a part. 
47. What has not yet occurred in spite of the existence, and the extensive 
work programme of the CDCC, is the development of any meaningful relation-
ships between the institutions (public and private) within the various 
countries involved. Such a process is complicated, ab initio by the 
differences in language between Haiti and the Dominican Republic and even 
their nearest CARICOM neighbour, Jamaica (though it must be observed that 
this has not inhibited, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the development of 
active, though informal "higgler" trading relations between Haiti and 
Jamaica, conducted by Jamaicans travelling to Haiti, to alleviate shortages 
in Jamaica). 
48. CARICOM has been hesitant to engage in a process that might !,widen:i 
the institution, at a time when it is widely felt that the 'deepening' 
process is not p'rd§fe§sing satisfactorily, due to factors not all within 
control of —states: At the same time the CDCC while undertaking a 
number of regI8h-WiQe f>r§§famiries of a technical nature aimed at providing 
over time a Bai§ idf 66-opgfat-iort, is not equipped to function as a 
facilitator ef inter-instit.ution relationships between the States. It 
possesses neither the system of Standing Committees nor that of private 
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sector allied institutions, nor the apparatus for functiengl 
co-operation characteristics of CARICOM. While these are lacking^ 
the political motivation which might sustain th§ l@Rg§r £erm 
technical work based at the CDCC's centre, ha§ §lse fepdgd to wane. 
49. It is possibly unfair to require of the CARICOM states at this 
point that they provide the bulk of the financial wherewithal for 
sustaining a substantial CDCC functional co-operation apparatus, 
in addition to that of CARICOM. But a complete exploration of the 
possibility and ability of the UNECLA system resources for something 
of this nature does not seem to us yet to have been made. (We are 
making here a distinction between the UNECLA system and the CDCC 
system which we shall attempt to develop in a subsequent section). 
50. The active relationships that developed in the second half of 
the 1970s between Jamaica and Cuba (initially supported by the 
CARICOM 'joint recognition' approach towards Cuba) suggested that 
there would have to develop in time some understandings or norms on 
diplomatic relationships between the States of the Northern Caribbean 
or Greater Antilles. (The development of an active component 
of the Socialist International in the Dominican Republic further 
suggested the possibilities of this). 
51. The normalisation of Cuba - CARICOM relationsihps were impeded, 
in a sense by the Cuban Government's assistance to the MPLA in 
Angola, utilising some CARICOM states as transit points, in an 
interesting reversal of the middle passage. The moral basis of this 
assistance is not necessarily at issue. What is pertinent to note 
is that some CARICOM Governments took the view that the engagement 
was one too substantial for states of their size and likely to draw 
the Great Power imbroglio further into the area. Dissonance of 
views within CARICOM on this matter halted the consensus approach to 
Cuba. 
52. The Cuban manoeuvre of assistance across the Atlantic brought 
into relief the question of the military weight of that country 
vis-a-vis other states in the Caribbean Basin, and has induced the 
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the search for counterweights - diplomatic and otherwise. This search has 
undoubtedly affected relationships within the CDCC. 
53. Any rationalisation of relationships in the Mo^thgiR @9Eifebean would 
undoubtedly have had to take into account the fact @f thg Uni|gd States 
geographical presence in that zone, through her jurigdietipn Puerto Rico. 
The semi-autonomous constitutional character of Puerto Rico would not 
therefore necessarily have inhibited her propogation of gome quasi-diplomatic 
activity in that area. (The active role of Puerto Rico in the 1950s in the 
Caribbean during the regime of Munoz Marin should be borne in mind here). 
There are indications now that Puerto Rico is inclined to assume some such 
role under the aegis of the proposed Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI); though 
the possibilities for it can either be enhanced or limited by the degree 
of receptivity of other CARICOM states. 
54. The Caribbean Basin Initiative is seen by some in Latin America as 
divisive, running counter to the efforts and aims toward closer economic and 
other relations in the whole region, and giving special advantages to the 
countries involved. It might be regarded as further emphasising what are 
regarded as the special or separate position of the Caribbean countries in 
relation to the region as a whole - a position already demonstrated by the 
subregion's links with Europe through the Lome Agreement and with the 
Commonwealth. 
55. The Caribbean Basin Initiative represents an attempt to boost the 
economies of these countries and others in the Caribbean and Central American 
area, so as to eliminate these perceived dangers. 
56. In some important matters there are serious differences of perception 
or policy between Latin America and the Caribbean arising from these 
relations. On the question of human rights - an issue pursued aggressively 
by the Carter regime in the United States, there was resentment in some 
Latin American countries, while Caribbean countries were among those which 
took positive positions on the issue. 
57. On the issue of "subversion" and the introduction of alien ideologies 
into the Caribbean, there is a division of opinion in the two groups 
of countries. While many in Latin America appear to see the Caribbean 
and Central America as danger spots in this respect, there is a large 
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body of opinion in the Caribbean which rejects the notion that the area 
should become in the words of Professor Gordon keyis "an index and 
symbol of the East-West conflict1'. 
58. This issue will probably become an ^ even more prominent one in 
the future as both Latin American and Caribbean countries face the 
turbulence which is already more than evident in their efforts to 
achieve economic growth, real social progress and political stability 
- in increasingly difficult world conditions. 
59. It is then, the potential in the types of arrangements 
discussed above, negative and/or positive, to which we refer inthe phrase 
"incomplete diplomatic coherence of intra-Caribbean relationships". 
What also becomes clear is that the enhancement of these relationships 
has to take cognisance of the role and significance of the United 
States in the area, either directly or indirectly through her 
territories. 
60. The American presence in the area is always motivated by a mix 
of material and ideological interests, though often rationalised under 
the aegis of her security interests. In the contemporary period the 
expression of protection of these interests has come to be enunciated 
in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). 
61. The ideological aspect of American interests appeared to have 
been met in the 1970s and early 1980s by an ideological counterweight 
in the developing nexus, cutting across traditional language and 
cultural barriers, between Guyana - Grenada - Jamaica - Cuba -
Nicaragua - Suriname. This nexus could be said to be another version 
of a Caribbean Basin system, unmediated by American power. But 
the fragile material underpinning of such an incipient system has 
not given it enough weight to withstand the separate frailties of 
its components and their susceptibility to pressure. 
62. In summary, what we can perceive is a series of actual or 
incipient diplomatic (geo-political) systems, of varying weights, with 
memberships that are mutually exclusive, each system to some extent 
in competition even though there are important elements of collaboration. 
New systems are represented in the acronyms CAR1C0M, CDCC, CBI, and in 
addition there is the framework of an incipient radical glli§rige? and the 
developing relationships of the Northern South American §ystgti}. 
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EXISTING PATTERNS OF EXTRA-REGIONAL RELATIONS 
63. The fundamental difference between Latin A^gFiea faribbean 
in so far as extra-regional relations afe cpnperned, derivgg the 
fact that most Latin American countries have beep in^q^e^ if} inter-
national relations for over one and one-Jialf pgnfurigs, while the 
Caribbean countries' experience in this sphere amounts to two decades, 
or less. 
64. Each of the two groups has diversified its relationships with 
the rest of the world considerably, starting with its original links 
with the metropolitan European powers, and reaching gradually out to 
wider relations with other North Atlantic countries, and with develop-
ing countries. 
65. For the purposes of this study, the central issue is the impact 
of these extra-regional relations on the relations between Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. 
66. In the case of Latin America, the links in terms of economic, 
cultural and sentimental terms have remained. Among the latest 
manifestations of this have been the call by some Latin American 
states for Spain to be granted full membership of ECLA, and the 
new programme of co-operation in education and other fields between 
Spain and Latin America. It has been suggested that Spain's 
membership of the European Economic Community might be seen as 
holding the prospect of an advantageous relationship between Latin 
America and that group. 
67. Migration from Europe deepened the ties, and widened them as 
English-speaking persons, Italians, Germans and others moved to both 
North and South America, and reinforced the already existing 
European element in the populations. 
68. Latin America is thus, in part, an extension of Europe, mainly 
in the cultural sense. But this factor is qualified by a number of 
circumstances. It has been observed that "Latin Americans have 
grown up, so to say, in opposition to Europe", and that they envisage 
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the rise of Latin America as Europe declines. Spain and Portugal have long 
lost their pre-eminence in European and in world affairs. 
69. Moreover, Latin America - with its long period of independent status, 
the fact that the countries axe numbered among the developing nations, their 
complex ethnic and cultural mix - represents at one and the same time two 
worlds. There are great differences between those countries in which the 
European element is dominant - such as in some of the states of Scuth 
America, and those in which the indigenous populations represents the 
predominant elements ~ as in most Central American states. 
70. In relations with industrialised countries, there are of course 
significant differences between the large Latin American countries such as 
Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, and the smaller ones. The larger countries, 
by reason of size, their huge economic potential, the goods they produce 
and sell on the world markets, their capacity for having diplomatic 
representation in a wide range of countries, their demand for technology and 
for investment funds and loans from Western and Japanese sources, are in a 
position to exercise much greater influence, and in turn to be taken more 
seriously. Argentina's actions in the face of United States attempts to 
impose an embargo on wheat sales to the USSR are a case in point. Mexico's 
energy endowment and the impact of this on her relations with the United 
States is another. 
71. As the Latin American economies and their export capabilities in 
secondary and other products grow, their pressure for greater access to 
the United States market becomes an increasingly contentious issue; and 
Latin America becomes increasingly critical on the issue of protectionism 
by the United States and other industrialised countries. 
72. Diversification of their economic and trading relationships for 
example, by way of the drive for increased trade with the EEC, Japan, the 
USSR and other Eastern European countries, and the efforts at stepping up 
intraregional economic relations are part of their strategy as what are 
now called "newly industrializing countries". 
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73. The Caribbean countries emerged into independence with their 
economies close linked with the western economic system and greatly 
dependent on that group. This was the -inevitable resuife o£ avav 
four hundred years of colonial status. In tg£m§ gf their epcfipigies 
and their political and governmental institutipris ? tjigji wg^ e; i^ j a sense 
extensions of the western systems. They h^ve souglit tp di^ efsqLf y their 
economies and to spread the range of their epgnomic and political 
relations. Much of their energies have been concentrated on the 
pursuit of their subregional relations (CARICOM, etc.) and through 
multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the Non-Aligned 
Movement, the Bretton Woods system. Their limited size and human 
and other resources have placed constraints on their capacity to 
establish diplomatic and economic contacts, and in this respect the 
multilateral route is seen by them as an appropriate substitute. 
74. Thus, Caribbean countries have few embassies, and these are 
found mainly in North America and Europe. They have sought in large 
part to protect from erosion, or to advance, the interests which they 
have in these countries by way of trading preferences or special 
arrangements in the marketing of products, or as sources of finance, 
tourism, and the well-being of Caribbean peoples who have emigrated. 
The United States 
75. The rise of the United States to the position of pre—eminence 
in the western world, has given that country a basis for establishing 
an almost overwhelming interest and influence in the affairs of 
Latin America. The search for a balanced relationship between that 
country and Latin America has occupied the attention of leaders and 
governments for a long time, and continues to do so. United States 
influence and ties with Latin America have been built upon the factor of 
proximity. Here a major element has been United States security 
concerns, and especially that country's efforts to restrain or 
eradicate "radical" influences which are presumed from time to time to 
threaten the area. United States interest and involvement have been 
expressed in a variety of ways, including direct military intervention, 
investment, trade, cultural contacts, and.the.impact of North American 
tastes and values and technology. ,, . 
76. The Central American countries and the island countries of the Carib-
bean, have received special attention from the United States, in part 
because of that country's concern wtih protecting the approaches to the Panama 
Canal- and in more recent times, because of the dangers as perceived by the 
United States and others, of radical, riot to say communist influence and 
insurgency. The United States interest in Cuba, for example, is a long-
standing one. That country's intervention in the Cuban war of liberation 
from Spain at the end of the nineteenth century, resulted in Cuba coming 
for a few years under United States military rule and being for a long 
period afterwards, through the mechanism of the Piatt Amendment, a virtual 
ward of the United States. 
77. There is more than an element of ambivalence on the part of Latin 
America towards this relationship - a mixture of admiration and recognition 
of the benefits of having so close an economic and military superpower, along 
with exasperation and sometimes anger at United States actions in or 
attitudes to the region. Varying U.S. official approaches to human rights 
have brought strong reactions from Latin America. Latin Americans tend to move 
from expectation to disappointment with the contribution of the United 
States in dealing with the basic long-term economic problems of the region. 
Canada 
78. Latin American relations with Canada have taken a hew turn in recent 
years. In the late 1960s the Trudeau administration sought to establish a 
specific set of policies in respect of Canada's relation with Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Steps were taken to articulate the new approaches and 
to make the necessary institutional changes - for example in the Department 
of External Affairs and other Departments. In 1971 Canada obtained 
Permanent Observer Status in the Organization of American States (OAS) and 
later achieved similar status in the Andean Group; and in 1972 full membership 
of the Inter-American Development Bank(IADB). These were expressions of 
Canada's perception of itself as "a distinctive North American country 
firmly rooted in the Western Hemisphere" and its desire "to explore 
new avenues of increasing our political and economic relations with 
Latin America where more than four hundred mjll4ei} pgqple will live 
by the turn of the century and where we h§ve §u|§£antigl interest". 
79. It is notable that in spite of stpgng fggljngg and pressures 
on Latin America and the United States, Capgffa has reserved the 
right to pursue its relations with Cuba in j.£s own way. This is 
one of the factors militating against her full membership of the OAS 
and accession to the Rio Treaty. Canada has refused to join in the 
trade embargo against Cuba, and Prime Minister Trudeau visited Cuba 
on his Latin American tour in 1976. On the other hand, in response 
to Cuba's emplacement in Africa, Canada, while increasing trade 
relationships has virtually stopped the grant of economic aid to 
that country. 
80. These approaches on the part of Canada represent in part that 
country's determination to maintain a foreign policy in global matter 
as well as hemispheric, independent of the United States, and in part 
her need for diversification of markets, especially in the face of 
difficulties in trade with Europe since the establishment of the 
EEC. By the same token this interest on the part of Canada opens 
wider opportunities in trade, investment and the like for Latin 
America. Over the years there has been an increasing interest and 
growth in direct investment of Canadian capital in Latin America. 
There is also considerable interaction between Latin America and 
Canada by way of special aid programmes directed to the Region 
through governmental and non-governmental channels. 
81. Canada, along with Mexico, shares a very long border with the 
United States. This, for each country, presents both opportunities 
and problems. The fact that both Canada and Mexico are major 
producers of petroleum, and sell to the United States is a factor 
of special significance. 
82. Also important is the strong interest of these three countries 
in Central America and the Caribbean, each having its own perceptions 
and its own prescriptions for these groups of countries. 
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83. The Caribbean countries have had a close relationship with Canada 
over a long period - through migration, trade, and investment in the 
mineral and other sectors. Note should be taken of the fpdi^s 
trade agreements, subject to renegotiation periodically. 
84. As a member of the Commonwealth, Canada has beer? in a special position 
to establish closer relations with the English-speaking G§rifjbean 
countries; that country has tended to increase its interest in this group 
of countries as the United Kingdom has become more and more preoccupied 
with its involvement in the European Economic community. 
85. After a review of aid policy in 1979-1980, a decision was taken by 
the Canadian Government to accord much higher priority to the Commonwealth 
Caribbean countries. Within this category, special attention was to be 
given to the Windward and Leeward Islands (OECS) group. The multilateral 
approach to the Caribbean was an important diviation from Canada's inclination 
towards bilateral assistance. 
'' 86. Canada has taken a determinedly independent view of the issue of the 
political and social upheavals in Central America and the Caribbean -i; 
a view which is close to that held by many in the Caribbean. Note should be 
taken also of her active development of trading relationships with many of 
the larger South American countries. It is possible that that country could 
play an even more positive role in the future in Caribbean/Latin American 
relations, and as a Commonwealth country with large interests in Latin 
America, play an important facilitative role for the Caribbean. 
The United Kingdom 
87. Relations between the Caribbean countries and the United Kingdom have 
been of particular significance in their impact on Caribbean/Latin American 
relations. And the Malvinas/Falklands issue has had a most serious impact 
on Latin American relations with the United Kingdom and on that region's 
relations with the Caribbean. 
«, 88. It appears that many Latin Americans were unable to understand from 
the time of the achievement of independence of Jamaica and Trinidad and 
B Tobago, the quite unique relationship between these countries and the U.K. 
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As a group of countries which had severed their conneetigg with their 
former metropolitan rulers and in a most vigorous way established 
free republics, it may have been difficult to accept that the 
Caribbean countries who retained the connection with the British 
Crown and the Commonwealth, were truly independent. 
89. This factor, in addition to the clear cultural and ethnic 
differences and the long period of colonial status of the Caribbean 
countries, seem to have posed a major question as to the type of 
relationship which might be cultivated between the newly independent 
Caribbean countries and Latin America. 
90. The Caribbean relationship with the United Kingdom has changed 
over the past two decades, as Canada and the United States have come 
to occupy a more prominent position in matters of trade, investment 
and the like, in respect of that group. But the special trading 
relations, the preferences on some Caribbean products in the United 
Kingdom market, continuing aid to most of the islands, migration to 
the United Kingdom, the maintenance of the Westminster political 
system and the Commonwealth connection, the common language, plus the 
fact that some territories in the Caribbean group have not yet 
achieved independence, all these together constitute a continuing 
special relationship. 
91. The Caribbean countries have demonstrated in a variety of ways 
their total independence and their freedom to take positons on economic 
and political issues which are in total opposition to those taken by 
the U.K. But the Malvinas issue has left many in Latin America 
with the feeling that the Caribbean countries have an overriding 
loyalty to the United Kingdom, and acted out of that sense of loyalty 
in their votes in the OAS, and in the deliberations on the issue at the 
United Nations. 
92. The (ruth is that the Malvinas issue has come up repeatedly over 
the years at the United Nations and in the Non-Aligned Movement, and 
CARICOM countries7 positions have always been strongly influenced by 
the fact that two of their group - Guyana and Belize - are the 
subjects of territorial claims by Venezuela and Guatemala respectively, while 
Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela have a dispute of a sQfne^ hat different 
character. While therefore the anachronism presented by the exi§tence of 
a Br itish colony in the south Atlantic near the end of the twentipth century 
had been widely recognised in the Caribbean, these countries have been and 
remain deeply concerned as to the manner in which the issue is approached by 
the contending parties. They have been in the case of Belize prepared to 
see a solution in the popular desire for a separate independence - now 
realised. 
93. The Caribbean countries disagreed strongly with the use of armed force 
as a way to the settlement of the claim. Apart from any considerations of 
morality, their situations as small entities with limitec military capabilities 
would, in addition, reinforce this view. The U.K. is involved in the Guyana/ 
Venezuela issue indirectly, as a signatory to the Geneva Agreement of 1966. 
And North Atlantic and other western countries and the rest of the world 
could become involved should the matter ever go the United Nations General 
Assembly or the Security Council. 
94. In the case of Belize, the dispute has often been raised at the United 
Nations, and has represented an important factor in Caribbean/Latin American 
relations. The Caribbean countries have taken a very active part in the 
efforts to resolve the issue - in favour as already indicated, of Belizean 
independence and have not hesitated to put heavy pressure on the United King-
dom in this matter. Since most of Latin America has come to accept the 
right of Belize to independence, the issue and the U.K.'s involvement 
has not seriously affected relations with the Caribbean countries. 
95. But in late June 1982, the new President of Guatemala restated that 
country's claim to Belize. With a United Kingdom military force in Belize, 
and in the face of the Malvinas war, now concluded, it is difficult to 
predict what might develop and how the Latin American/Caribbean relationship 
would be affected, given especially, the inclination to political instability 
in Guatemala itself. 
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Europe 
96. The major elements in the relationship between Latin American 
and Caribbean countries and Europe - elements which affect the 
relations between the two groups are; 
The Lome^Agreement 
The reactions of European countries to the situation 
in Central America 
- The Malvinas/Falkland Islands issue. 
97. The Lome''Agreement, providing special trading, investment 
and other relations between the EEC countries and the group of 
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, has from the outset been 
seen by Latin America as a preferential and special set of relation-
ships which discriminated against their countries. Some regard it 
as cutting across the lines laid down in the struggle for the New 
International Economic Order. It might very well be used to 
reinforce in the minds of some, the feeling that the ex-colonies 
of the United Kingdom and France and other European countries are not 
truly independent. 
98. While some Latin American countries have established special 
relations with the EEC in trade and the like, and others seem quite 
ready to so do, the Lome relationship remains a source of serious 
difference and difficulty between Caribbean and Latin American 
countries. These difficulties are reflected in the tensions between 
the Caribbean and the Latin American groups in Brussels. 
99. Some European countries, either directly through their 
governments, or otherwise, have shown their deep concern about 
developments in Central America, and also in the Caribbean. They 
have teñded to take a position different in real substance, from 
thâi taken by some Latin American countries and by the United 
Stâfês; This centres around the question as to whether the turbu-
]eh¿tí íñ these Countries has mainly been generated by "subversive" 
elements, with support (military and logistical) and encouragement 
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from outside - or is the outcome of deep rooted social feeling stemming from 
long neglect and deprivation and lack of opportunity for participating 
in political life in the countries. European opinion tg §yppo£t £tie 
latter position. 
100. The joint declaration by the Governments of Mexie§ gi^ d Ffjange gg^cern-
ing the importance of recognizing the insurgents in El ggly^dor as an 
element to be involved in any resolution of that country's problems, was a 
case in point. It brought very critical reactions from a number of Latin 
American countries and from one or two Caribbean countries also. 
101. But it would seem that the Caribbean as a whole, and partly because 
of their own difficult circumstances, and their experience of ideological 
pluralism, are aware of fhe way in which poverty and frustration and economic 
hardship in general can lead to political and social upheaval ~ and in this 
sense they would be closer to the European perception. 
The United Nations 
102. The Latin American countries - twenty of them - became members of 
the United Nations at its establishment. (It is to be noted that Latin 
American countries were members of the League of Nations and therefore have 
had long experience in multilateral diplomacy). As the United Nations 
encouraged by Latin America, resorted to the Regional Group system for some 
of its work, these countries constituted the Latin American Group, and 
that group remained fixed in numbers until 1962 when Jamaica and then Trinidad 
and Tobago became independent. 
103. In the Bretton Woods system, those countries had a special position 
forming three constituencies with three seats on the Executive Boards of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). 
104. At the United Nations the advent of the newly independent Caribbean 
states appeared to present some difficulties to the Latin American countries 
in the matter of the former's acceptance as members of that Group. But 
these were eventually overcome. Today some eleven Caribbean countries 
are members of the United Nations and represent more than one-third of the 
membership of the Latin American Group. The contribution of these countries 
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to the Group has been acknowledged by some Latin Americans. 
This represents one of the positive opportunities for cooperation between 
the two groups of countries and it has been used to advantage on many 
occasions. 
105. Nevertheless, marked differences have arisen on occasion. 
The Group works by consensus and therefore will take account of all 
views. It also deals in the main with procedural (non-substantive) 
issues, such as candidatures for positions on the United Nations 
bodies, chairmanship of such bodies and the like. Here the matter of 
balancing of the interests of both groups in selection for such 
positions has been the subject of discussion from time to time. 
106. Occasionally, substantive issues are taken up by ¿he Latin 
American Group. In a matter like the Panama Canal issue, solidarity 
has been maintained. But the issue of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands 
recently was, as already intimated, the subject of serious 
differences. 
107. On substantive issues Latin America and the Caribbean work 
well together on most economic issues, particularly those pertaining to 
the New International Economic Order and Global Negotiations. On 
some political issues there are wide differences. On some of these 
many Caribbean countries tend to have positions closer to those of 
other Third World countries of Africa and Asia. 
108. The Latin American countries are very active in Group of 77 
matters in the different United Nations bodies (New York, Geneva, 
etc.). In recent years inputs have been made on certain matters 
through the Group by such bodies as the Latin American Economic 
System (SELA). 
109. A number of Latin American countries are members of the 
Non-Aligned Movement, but that region has a lower proportion of 
membership of the Movement than Africa and Asia. The Caribbean count-
ries, certainly those who first achieved independence, have been 
closer to that Movement. 
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PARTICIPATION IN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
110. The central question pertaining to institutional relatipns between the 
English-speaking Caribbean States and those of Sqpth and genferal America, 
as the former became independent, was whether they shoitl4 join the Organiza-
tion of American States» and along with that institution, the Inter-American 
Development Bank. 
111. For some countries, the imperative to join the OAS was greater than 
for others. It was felt in some cases that to the extent that geographical 
location suggested close relations in the future between themselves and par-
ticular Latin American States, then it would be useful to join the major 
political institution that influenced some of these relations. Other Carib-
bean Governments were aware that under the rules of hemispheric institutional 
relations, it would not be possible to benefit from the extensive financial 
resources available in the Inter-American Development Bank without adherence 
Co the OAS. 
112. Most Caribbean Governments were aware of the dominance of the United 
States in the OAS, and the manipulative use of the institution by that coun-
try periodically, to achieve or legitimise its security objectives. They 
noted the continuing reluctance of Canada, the other Commonwealth country on 
the continent, to accept membership of the OAS, even while she noted that 
there were certain functional activities in the system, participation in which 
would be mutually beneficial to herself and other Hemispheric States. 
113« The argument, however, was mcogniged that these newly independent States 
all fell into the security ¿one covered by the mutual defence and security 
component of the OAS (the Treaty of Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance - the 
Rio Treaty), and that they would inevitably be affected by activities under-
taken within, their section o£ the. ¡security ¡son© under the aegis of the Rio 
Treaty, in such a situation, it was argued, it was on balance more useful to 
be within th® organisation attempting to influence its functioning than out-
side it as a mere object of its activity. The independent CARICOM countries, 
with two exceptions, have since became members of the OAS, though only Trini-
dad and Tobago has adhered to the Rio Treaty. Guyana aad Belige, through 
the persistent efforts of CARICQM partners, have gained eligibility for 
membership in the IADB, in spite of the exclusionary clause of the OAS Charter 
prohibiting them from membership of the OAS - a stipulation which the gARIgQl-
States are still actively seeking to remove. The OPCS Group of States, are, 
for reasons relating to their small economic size, not members of the 1ADB, 
though they are eligible indirectly for assistance from it. 
114. Yet in the process of making preliminary approaches to join the Inter-
American institutional system, many Anglophone Caribbean Governments were 
up against sensitivities of some Latin American Goyernments towards them. 
These involved lack of clarity about their actual constitutional status and 
therefore concern about it; concern about motivations for joining the sys-
tem; certain assumptions about the small size of the Caribbean States and 
their susceptibility to manipulation against the interests of Latin Ameri-
can States; concern about the possibility of the Caribbean countries, many 
of them miniscule in population and financial weight, when compared with 
most La^ iin American States, gaining numerical dominance in the OAS, and 
thus threatening their institutional hegemony within the organization. 
^Caribbean Governments noted, too, that in terms of status ranking, rela-
tionships within the hemispheric institutions tended to be based on a highly 
«stratified system. 
115. Many of these concerns we^e noted by the late Prime Minister of Trini-
dad and Tobago, Dr. Eric Williams, in his contribution to the first debate 
on foreign relations held by the newly independent parliament of that coun-
try. But in time, assisted by the active desire of the United States that 
the Caribbean States should complete the Inter-American Institutional Sys-
tem's geographical coverage by adherence to it, some of these sensitivities 
were overcome. 
116. The reverberations of the Argentina/Falklands Islands - Malvinas/United 
Kingdom issue in the Organization of American States, and the reactions of 
most CARICOM Governments have as x^ e have indicated earlier, however, brought 
some of these sensitivities to the fore again. In particular there is the 
question of the numerical preponderance of the CARICOM States and the types 
of alliances that they are likely to engage in. The sharp differences in 
positions on the Falklands/Malvinas issue taken by Latin American States, 
Venezuela in particular, have highlighted this situation. 
117. Nevertheless, it can be said that there is perhaps now a greater aware-
ness on the part of relevant Latin American States of the motivations under-
lying Caribbean Governments diplomatic orIen|:;atie!n§; of ttie sensitivities ef 
the Caribbean Governments themselves concerning gssgrt-igns §|a9Vlt nature 
of their sovereignty; and of the interests connecting gayibhgan States and 
Latin American States in the Caribbean Basin, to stem a possible deteriora-
tion of relations deriving from this contentious issue. 
118. It has been remarked by some observers that, in spite of much progress 
made in the course of the period since the late 1960's, the CARICOM Govern-
ments in the institutions.of the Inter-American System can still benefit 
from a deeper understanding of the possibilities for effective manipulation 
of these highly bureaucrat! ed organizations. The prerequisites for this 
are, of course, partly limited by the still relatively small number of Carib-
bean professionals working within the system, and1 the lack of familiarity of 
many. Caribbean diplomatic participants in the system with the mode of legal 
and political principles and practices that dominate its functioning. 
119. On the other hand, it could be said that these deficiencies and their 
attendant consequence of failing to draw the full quota of possible benefits 
from the institutions, are due to Governments' lack of understanding of the 
necessity for the development of a cadre of international public servants 
over a period of time, skilled in the mores and manipulation of such insti-
tutions . 
120. Given the relatively small pool from which such a cadre can be drawn, 
the necessity for intra-CARICOM cooperation in such an endeavour becomes 
apparent. The importance of this can be further appreciated if we focus, 
as we do below, on the new hemispheric institutions that came into existence 
in the 1970's. 
121. The question has been raised from time to time as to what the OAS as 
an institution can be used to do, in terms of facilitating the development 
of relations between the many Anglophone States and the older Latin American 
States; especially as this is likely to be hindered by cultural gaps, and 
differences in perceptions borne of differing colonial experiences, and im-
pediments placed in the way of cooperation by colonial powers. The increas-
irxg awareness, by Caribbean Governments at least, of the implications @f 
their geographical locations, an awareness made sharper by the recent in-
dependence of Belize, emphasizes the importance of this question. 
122. Note has been taken by some observers of the relative lack, still 
after 20 years of independence of some CARICOM States, of education in 
culture and language oriented towards Latin America. Education in the 
Spanish language when not undertaken in CARICOM Country schools and 
universities, is laregly undertaken in the institutions of metropolitan 
countries. Student and staff exchange between Caribbean and Latin 
American tertiary institutions is still relatively limited. The use 
of electronic media in either the CARICOM or Latin American States 
for the development of educational programmes on the countries, and 
for the removal of stereotypes, is minimal. 
123. The problem of cultural education is for the CARICOM States a dual 
one. It has to be directed at both the Spanish-speaking Caribbean 
States and the States of the wider South/Central American Zone, coun-
tries organized on differing cultural and sociological experiences. 
124. No OAS institutions of a technical or cultural nature now exist 
in a CARICOM State. There have been suggestions that a major hemis-
pheric centre, under the aegis of the OAS, concerned with language and 
cultural education should be established in the CARICOM area, making 
full use of modern approaches to education using the electronic media. 
Consideration might be given to this. Such an institution would comple-
ment the bilateral programmes now increasing particularly between 
CARICOM States and the mainland States in their immediate geographical 
environment, within the framework of scientific, technical and cultural 
cooperation. 
125. Further as the CARICOM/Central American State of Belize consolidates 
its independence, consideration should be given to utilizing its geo-
graphical and cultural characteristics as a "bridging" State between the 
Anglophone and Spanish-speaking countries, for the establishment of ter-
tiary education facilities concerned with training in the Spanish language 
and culture. 
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126. Some CARICOM States found, in the 1970's, that they ghared with borne 
Latin American Countries interests in increasing their strength autonomy 
in negotiation with larger metropolitan States in respect of areas like 
commodity trade, shipping and energy. This orientation reflected the per-
ception of developing countries of the possible benefits to be derived from 
so-called South-South cooperation. 
127. Thus unlike their roles and status in the older hemispheric institutions, 
the CARICOM States found that they could play an important part in the ne-
gotiations concerning, and organization of, the new "special interest" Organ-
izations, SELA, NAMUCAR, OLADE, GEPLACEA for example. There was considerable 
diplomatic effort made by the larger CARICOM States to ensure effective par-
ticipation in formulating the aims and objectives of such organizations. 
128. Yet the record, and sense of achievement, of CARICOM States in these 
organizations appears to have been mixed. And as financial constraints have 
imposed themselves, and CARICOM States have become more concerned with domestic 
economic policy in the early 1980's, their interest in these organizations 
seems to be beginning to wane. We understand that one CARICOM State has with-
drawn from participation in NAMUCAR which has itself experienced financial 
difficulties. 
129. The symbolic importance of many of these organizations lay in the fact 
that they were intended to function free of the alleged domination of the 
United States, and of the highly politicised atmosphere, that characterized 
the older hemispheric institutions. On the other hand it was felt that some 
Latin American and Caribbean States, using some of the resources gained from 
the 1970's increases in commodity prices, could autonomously support the 
work programmes of these institutions. This has not proven to be always the 
case as world recession has affected the economies of some of the States. 
130. The less issue-specific organization, SELA, was intended to be the major 
proponent of Latin American and Caribbean initiatives in economic and technical 
assistance cooperation. It was open to question whether there might not be 
some duplication of orientation and effort between this new institution and 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America; though this was 
thought not to be the case. 
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131. The necessity for effective CARICOM State participation in SELA was 
recognized in the constitutional structuring of the organization. Vet it 
probably cannot be said at this time that the interest, or siepse @f geftigve-
ment in this organization on the part of these states is high. 
A more open recognition, in this period of austerity lessened con-
centration on "commodity confrontation politics", could be made in this 
organization, of the more particular requirements of the CARICOM gtates as 
relatively small countries within the continental context; of their need 
for resources and technical assistance that strengthens their internal 
capacities for production and entry into Latin American markets; and of the 
need to allocate financial resources on a sub-regional basis to the Carib-
bean States for these purposes. 
Towards this end the CARICOM countries could utilize either the ECLA 
or CARICOM Secretariats for undertaking an evaluation of their participa-
tion in SELA. 
''132. Finally an important point that should be noted about many of the new 
special-interest institutions which we have already hinted at, is the par-
tr, 
ticular "political" context of their establishment in the period of de-
veloping-developed country confrontationist politics of the 1970's. It is 
probably the case that, in that context, more attention was paid to shap-
ing their external orientation, than to ensuring their survival as instru-
ments of South-South cooperation in an era of austerity and developed country 
protectionism. It is probably the case that a close examination now needs 
to be made of the needs of particular categories of States within them. In 
that context, the CARICOM States would not necessarily find themselves as 
an exclusive grouping, but might find areas of commonality and joint planning 
with other Caribbean States and even some small mainland countries. 
UN/ECLA - CDCC AND THE CARICOM STATES 
133. The probable commonality of interests and problems of the Caribbean 
^States as a whole was no doubt part of the basis for grouping them within 
a third arena of Caribbean-Latin American relations - this time within 
the United Nations system of regional and sub-regional agencies. 
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134. The CAR I COM States are late entrants to those systems (UN/EC; a, 
UNDPv UNI.CEF, UNESCO) which they have found in this hemisphere of 
necessity dominated by Latin American constitutional and political modes. 
The very location of the headquarters of many of these regional agencies 
has been indicative of this tendency. Though as a further development, sub-
regional agencies have been established in CARICOM, Caribbean or Caribbean 
Basin States. 
135. In many of these UN Agencies the question has arisen, with the dramatic 
increase in Caribbean representation, of the degree of real autonomy and in-
fluence in the formulation and implementation of programme that these coun-
tries possess. It is fair to say that in recent years there has been some 
expression of sensitivity on this question on the part of the older members 
of these agencies; arid an attendant attempt at institutional innovations 
aimed at coming to grips with it. Yet, within what are highly bureaucratized 
institutions with extremely legalistic ways' of procedure, these innovations 
are felt by some Caribbean States to represent only the beginnings of the search 
for effective autonomy, influence and benefit. 
136.The UN/ECLA-CDCC system can be taken as indicative, of this phenomenon. 
The organization of the Caribbean Development and Co-operation Committee 
(CDCC) follows by a decade at least, the establishment of the ECLA Subregional 
Office in Port of Spain. The two are serviced by the same Secretariat, and co 
all intents and purposes constitute one organization. 
137. Yet the motivation for the addition of a new institution, the CDCC, to 
the already existing one, suggest a certain dissatisfaction with the ECLA-type 
of formulation of subregional system for the Anglophone Caribbean. At the 
narrower level of diplomacy (geopolitics) the formation of the CDCC could be 
seen as providing the CARICOM States with a mechanism for linking themselves 
in functional and other activities to the other States of the archipelago, 
while maintaining their own institutional coherence. On the other hand, the 
definition of the membership of the CDCC would separate it from the wider 
Caribbean Basin concept. 
138. In sum, then, the inspirations of the formation of ECLA Subregional 
Office on the one hand, and of the CDCC on the other, obviously differ. 
ECLA emanates from the logic of the UN system; CDCC from an internal Carib-
bean inclination to 'complete' the organizational potential of archipelago 
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relations. It has been argued by some that the formation of the GDCC r§= 
presents an evolution of the ECLA subregional concept itself. But the npw 
acknowledged lack of articulation between the UN/ECLA system and the GDgC 
argues against this kind of formulation. 
139. We can therefore make analytically, precisely because of its indication 
in practice, a distinction between ECLA and CDCC, in spite of their institu-
tional uniformity. And we can suggest from this that the two have still not 
been effectively synthesized either in objectives or functioning. CDCC has 
not therefore been able to effectively draw on ECLA and the UN system for 
resources and legitimacy, as may be supposed to have been the intention of 
its promoters. 
140. In the description of the CDCC's structure and activities, it is as-
serted that it should "act as a coordinating body for whatever activities 
relating to development and cooperation may be agreed upon and to serve as 
an advisory and consultative body to the Executive Secretary of ECLA in 
uespect of Caribbean issues and circumstances". 
141. Difficulties experienced from the Caribbean end in satisfactorily 
running the organization have led to a number of investigations into its 
procedures and suggestions for improvement of lines of communication be-
tween the Caribbean Office and the Santiago Headquarters, The reports of 
the Joint Inspection Unit (December 1980) and the Administrative Manage-
ment Services Team (1981/2) are indicative in this respect. 
142. Comparisons have also been made between the levels of autonomy of the 
Caribbean Office on the one hand and the Mexico and Bogota subregional 
Offices of ECLA on the other; and the suggestion has been advanced that the 
Caribbean Office should be "upgraded" to the level of the others. 
143. This lack of synthesis between CDCC/Port of Spain and the rest of the 
system, and the deficiencies deriving from it, supersede in importance the 
so-called 'ideological' and 'personality' differences existing within the 
organization. The CDCC forum, lacking real means of influencing the UN 
system (for resources), because the ECLA Subregional Office concept still 
takes precedence over it, has therefore in turn failed to gain legitimacy 
*In the eyes of its very members. 
144. If we view the problem in this way, then it is insufficient , to 
suggest as an institutional solution to it, that the ECLA Port of Spain 
Subregional Office be given the same level of autonomy a§; §§y, t}ie Mexico 
Office, important though this may be. What neec|§ ftp feg rgfjiRyed js the 
obvious tension between the older subregional officg ggpcegf and the more 
recent CDCC concept. The former, by practice, has its ii^ pu^ se from the top 
of the very hierarchical UN system; therefore the work programme, even when 
formulated within the subregion, has to await legitimacy from outside of 
the region, even though from within the UN/ECLA system as a whole. 
145. It does not, therefore, seem too radical to say that the tension be-
tween the two de facto systems should be removed by abolishing the concept 
of the ECLA Subregional Office, and establishing the concept of the CDCC 
as the system for the area and as the ECLA system of representation in the 
area. Two questions follow from this suggestion. First, what would be the 
practical objective of it? And secondly, what would be the practical impli-
cations of it, in terms of the Caribben countries' relations with Latin 
American States. 
146. The objective for Caribbean States of a Subregional Organization within 
the United Nations system, and within the South-Central zone, should be two-
fold. It should allow the countries sufficient scope to formulate an in-
digenously-oriented work programme, and provide them with the means (the 
negotiating instruments) to obtain assistance from the UN system as a whole, 
without the complications of mediation from within the wider geopolitical area. 
Secondly, it should, as one subregional system in Latin America among others, 
provide the CARICOM States in particular with a bridge for directly maintain-
ing and strengthening relations with other subregional groupings of the con-
tinent within the UN system. 
147. The practical implications for Caribbean-Latin American relations follow 
from this. A CDCC subregional system could come to constitute the main mech-
anism for preparation towards horizontal economic cooperation (ECDC and TCDC) 
among Latin American and Caribbean States. A continuing mechanism for iden-
tifying resources for assistance from the more industrialized South American 
States, including those with no immediate geopolitical connections with the 
Caribbean, and from institutions within these States, seems necessary at 
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this time. The link with the wider ECLA system would be necessary for this. 
And here the coordinating function of the CDCC would be important. 
148. Further, it seems to be the c^se that there is at preHent. littje com-
munication between the ECLA Caribbean system and the system represented Jay 
other ECLA Subregional Offices within the continent. A more direct link-
age between them should enhance the relationships between thg narrower 
CARICOM grouping and the rest of the region. And none of this would inhi-
bit bilateral relations, by way for example of the various Mixed Commissions 
now existing. For these, while meant to be for a continuing interchange, 
are in fact characterized by sporadic activity. 
149. But there does seem to be much to be gained from having an institution 
directly concerned with identifying areas of assistance in the South American 
Zone that might be beneficial to the CARICOM States precisely in some of the 
areas in which the CDCC now concentrates: language, food production and tech-
nology, science and technology, sea resources. Insufficient use is made of 
the ECLA system by the CARICOM States in terms of that system's wide network 
of relations and contacts within the South-American Zone. 
150. Would an autonomous CDCC Subregional system, negotiating assistance from 
the UN and Latin American systems, inhibit the activity of the CARICOM Secre-
tariat? This would not seem to be the case. Conflict would only be prone to 
arise if the two institutions were seeking resources from the same sources, 
and concentrating their main diplomatic activities, and activities in respect 
of economic and technical assistance in the same areas. But a properly 
organized CDCC system should have the comparative advantage in the Latin-
American area. 
151. What now seems therefore to be required, given the suggestions already 
made by the Joint Inspection Unit and Administrative Management Services, is 
the establishment of a small working group to revise the substantive terms 
of reference for a Caribbean Subregional Secretariat (UN/CDCC), to reflect 
the following: 
(a) a uniform institutional system, rather than the 
currently existing dual ECLA/CDCC one, as suggested fc1 
above; and 
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(b) the necessity for the subregional system to concentrate 
its resources on strengthening Caribbean country re-
lations with relevant Latin American countries, and 
with private and public sector institutions within 
them, identifying and systematizing forms of assist-
ance and cooperation possible between the Caribbean 
countries and in particular, industrializing Latin 
American States. 
152. Secondly, the revised terms of reference should focus on establish-
ing a bureaucratic relationship with ECLA Headquarters which would en-
hance the latter's capacity to bring the Caribbean Office into continu-
ing relationships with the other ECLA Subregional. Offices in Latin 
America, to facilitate the CDCC tasks outlined above. 
153. Thirdly, the revised terms of reference should seek to simplify 
the relationship between a new CDCC and the UN system as a whole, par-
ticularly in respect of funding. 
154. This Working Group should also explore the types of relationships 
that major and more highly industrialized Latin American countries might 
wish to have with a strengthened Caribbean Office; and the possible 
forms and levels of assistance that they might wish to allocate for 
Caribbean States' development needs, through the ECLA system, and to 
the CDCC as an institution. This should be of assistance particularly 
to the smaller Caribbean States. 
155. Finally, the Working Group should explore the relationship between 
the CDCC Secretariat and the CARICOM Secretariat, suggesting a possible 
division of labour along the lines of comparative advantage suggested 
above. 
156. The composition of the Working Group should reflect the interests 
of the UN-ECLA system, thè CARICOM system and a representative cross 
section of Caribbean countries. 
NEW STRATEGIES AND FORMATS 
157. This section speaks to a number of areas in which action of 
an immediate or longer term nature seems to us necessary gnfi pggsible. 
The idea here is to provide a reasonably wide agenda wfyich migjit be 
selectively of interest to differing institutions an<I states. 
Information 
158. It appears that little information in the form of news or 
otherwise filters through to the two groups of countries about each 
other. To correct this will call for special efforts, on the part of 
the media, in the preparation or exchange of specific material which 
provides a basis for improved knowledge and understanding. 
Language 
159. An essential ingredient here, as in all other aspects of the 
relations between the two groups, is the matter of language. The 
barrier is a major one. Action here could include: 
- further promotion of the teaching of Spanish in schools 
and other institutions in the non-Spanish-speaking Caribbean. (It 
would be useful to know the status of the English Language in Latin 
American countries in general); 
- opportunities for students to study Spanish/English in the 
countries using these languages. At present many persons from the 
Caribbean go to such places as North America for study of Latin 
American affairs and Spanish; 
the provision of translation services for interesting or 
important documents so that they may be available to each group. 
Education 
160. The introduction in their educational institutions by each 
linguistic group of study programmes relating to the historical, 
cultural, social and other circumstances of the other. These 
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programmes should include: 
- visiting lecturers at universities; 
student exchange; and 
other contacts between universities, e,g. thrpygh RlAli: 
In all of these, and in other areas, the regional and subregipnal institutions 
can play a major role. 
Cultural and Related Areas 
161. Some of the issues raised in this report, and in particular those 
related to culture and ethnic and social factors in, and differences between 
Latin America and the Caribbean, could well be the subject of more pene-
trating analysis and frank discussion by way of symposia. These could involve 
a range of persons with special interests in, and knowledge of, the following 
matters: 
- promotion of sporting contacts; 
- promotion of cultural contacts in such fields as music, dance, 
literature and art. 
Contact and exchanges in these areas would be of particular value. 
Regional Organizations 
162. At present a review of the role and operation of the OAS is underway. 
The 1980s, as the opening years have shown, will be a period of considerable 
difficulty for the region and for the world; and an increasing focus on 
South-South co-operation is developing. The Executive Secretary of ECLA has 
stated that the 1980s will be a period of introspection in the world and that 
this provides an opportunity to review the state of the relations between 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 
163. It seems to be an appropriate moment for a review of the role and 
working of some of the major institutions in the Region - with particular 
attention to their capacity for improving the interaction between the member 
countries, notably between the Caribbean and Latin American countries. To such 
an exercise, the Caribbean countries should seek to make a valuable 
contribution. 
-1544-
164. Parallel to this is the need to look more closely at £he 
capacity and the performance of the Caribbean countrieg - §pd indeed, 
other smaller countries of the Region - in their involvement in the 
work of the institutions, and their ability to derive adequate benefits 
as well as to make worthwhile contributions. 
165. Caribbean countries should ensure that they make the fullest 
possible effort to work with these organizations, to understand their 
operations, to participate, to send adequate delegations to meetings 
and to obtain equitable presence of their nationals on the staff of 
these organizations. This involves the language f actor. The Caribbean 
countries must ensure that their delegations are at no disadvantage in 
the matter of language - neither in respect of documentation, 
interpretation at formal meetings, nor in informal contacts. 
166. One method which can be used here is the attachment of 
officials from the Caribbean for short periods to Regional Organizations 
to familiarise them with their practices. 
167. A specific issue which might bear examination is the question 
of the Rio Treaty and the fact that so far only one Caribbean country 
is a signatory. The view has been expressed that regardless of any 
difficulties posed by the terms of the Treaty, in today's circumstances, 
the accession by Caribbean countries might remove a source of 
difficulty in the Caribbean/Latin American relations. At present these 
countries cannot participate or vote in meetings of Rio Treaty 
countries - as was the case in the Malvinas issue. Signing the Treaty 
would, it is argued, allow them to influence the deliberations. 
168. There is also of course the issue of Clause 8 - the Exclusionary 
Clause - and this was raised by Caribbean countries at the St. Lucia 
meeting of the OAS. The question of accession by the Caribbean 
countries must be linked to this matter. 
Subregional Organizations 
169. While attempts have been made, there has not been a regular 
system of contact between subregional integration organizations such 
as CACM, OLADE, LAFTA and CAR1C0M. It woulu seem vital that such 
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contacts should now be promoted. They could begin on an informal b^sis with 
a very general agenda. 
170. The possibilities of some links between CACM and CARICOM were raised 
in discussions. This would be a major device for building a relationship 
between Central American and Caribbean countries which in spite of major 
differences, have some elements in common, e.g. size, and are subject to 
special attention as a region "'in -rouble" or a source of trouble. 
171. In addition, the issue of Guatemala's claim on Belize and its impact 
on Caribbean and Central American relations, could be put in a new and 
perhaps more favourable atmosphere, as a result of close relations and 
co-operation between the two subregions. In this Belize can be an important 
bridging element. 
172. Following are some possible areas of co-operation between CACM and 
CARICOM, indeed between subregional integration organizations in the Region 
in general: 
- contact and co-operation between trade promotion institutions; 
this could be done under the aegis of CARICOM, and/or the Caribbean 
Association of Industry and Commerce in co-operation with national trade 
promotion institutions; 
- trade missions - (some have already taken place) including 
private sector commercial and industrial interests; and 
exploration of the possibilities of joint ventures in production 
perhaps with the prospect of taking advantage of the United States acceptance 
of the principle of cumulative origin in the granting of preferences to goods 
entering the United States market. 
173. In the face of the great difficulties experienced by all of the 
subregional integration movements, the view is held by some that this approach 
to economic and other forms of co-operation has serious flaws and has not 
worked in this Region or elsewhere in the world. At the same time this 
approach involves a considerable input in financial and human resources. 
A vigorous appraisal in co-operation with such subregional organizations and 
taking advantage of the work of such bodies in other parts of the world, 
could be of significant value. It could help to point the way in future 
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efforts, including those directed at better co-operation be^een Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. Moreover, it could hgve gn important 
bearing on the now more assertive movement toward South-South 
co-operation. This study would be an expression of Caribbean/Latin 
American co-operation and a contribution to the wider Third World 
Community. 
174. The question of establishing some preferential arrangements 
between CARICOM and other integration groups, has been raised in our 
discussions. While the prospects might not be great, the matter may be 
worth examining. 
Improvement of Co-operation between Individual Countries 
175. .A number of Latin American countries have traditional links 
with Caribbean countries and in recent years the level of such interaction 
has increased significantly, for example in the cases of Venezuela, 
Colombia and Mexico. The promotion of further co-operation calls for 
better knowledge and information on all sides, and particularly for 
specific efforts to seek out fruitful areas of possible co-operation 
in economic and other sphares. 
176. In respect of co-operation ventures undertaken on a national basis, 
the operations of NAMUCAR, and the attempts by Mexico, Venezuela and 
Jamaica toward joint ventures involving bauxite and energy (JAVAMEX) 
represent two of the major examples. Important lessons could be 
learned from the experiences in respect of these projects; some 
evaluation could therefore be undertaken of them. 
177. More generally, in the field of Science and Technology policy 
and applications, some contacts have been made between Caribbean countries 
and those of Latin America. Experience indicates, however, that there 
are a number of the latter states which are now reasonably advanced 
in the adaptation and development of technologies appropriate to the 
level of economic advancement and scale of the Caribbean states. 
178. Within the CARICOM/CDCC area there are now a number of 
institutions and programmes concerned with this problem - ECLA, UNESCO, 
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the Universities of the West Indies and Guyana, as well as National Science 
and Technology councils. An effort should be made towards harmonising the 
programmes of the various institutions, for a more effective apprgagh towards 
capitalising on the experiences of the Latin American States. 
179. In addition, the Caribbean Basin Environment Programme approved by 
Ministerial meeting in Jamaica in 1981 and involving some 27 countries, 
represents a unique attempt at co-operation between these countries. it 
affords an example for the future. The early implementation of elements in 
this programme, and in particular, the establishment of the institutions agreed 
on, the Regional Co-ordinating Unit and the Monitoring Committee as well 
as Regional Legal Agreement and the Trust Fund, would be a real boost to the 
process of co-operation between Caribbean and Latin American countries. 
Co-operation in International and Other Institutions 
180. In the United Nations system, the opportunity for close co-operation 
between Latin American and Caribbean countries exists by way of the Regional 
Group operations. The practice of providing support - studies, position papers 
* and occasionally, personnel - by way of the regional institutions (SELA and ECLA) 
can be of real value, especially in the absence of a Group of 77 Secretariat. 
The existence of such a Secretariat, and some modest effort is being made towards 
this, would of course provide a more effective means of funnelling such 
support from the Region's institutions. However, it would be important to 
ensure that these efforts represented the balanced interests of various elements 
in the Latin American and Caribbean community, and that they do not put the 
Region into difficulties with the other sectors of the Group of 77 in the 
United Nations. 
181. In the Bretton Woods institutions, most of the Caribbean countries do 
not belong to the three Latin American constituencies; they are, however, 
represented in the Group of 9 caucus of developing country Executive Directors 
and in the Group of 24. There may be ways in which Caribbean and Latin 
American co-operation in these institutions could be advanced - but again, 
" without creating difficulties in respect of other developing country interests. 
182. The Lome Agreement and the EEC/ACP relationship to the extent that they 
should constitute a problem in Latin American/Caribbean relations, could be 
examined specifically to establish objectively the extept e>f any real 
disadvantage suffered by Latin America vis-a-vis the Caribbean. (It 
could well be that such disadvantage is far less than it is believed 
to be). Account would be taken of special agreements established 
between the EEC and individual Latin American countries and efforts by 
others to establish such relationships, for example, CACM countries. 
General 
183. In pursuing efforts toward improving Latin American/Caribbean 
relations and the level of co-operation, it must be recognized that there 
are major differences in the legal and constitutional systems as 
between the two group of countries, for example, the separation of 
powers stemming basically from the difference between the Westminster and 
the "United States" systems. These differences have a bearing on 
relations between countries, for example on the processes of decision 
making and of negotiation. A better understanding on both sides of such 
differences and their significance for relations could be an important 
contribution. 
The improvement of relations and the level of co-operation will 
call for improvements in the manner in which Caribbean and Latin 
American subregional and regional affairs are dealt with, particularly 
in Government institutions and agencies, for example, in the degree of 
specialization within Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Commerce 
and Industry in these matters, and in the establishment of expertise, by 
adequate training, and by ensuring that language differences do not 
present a serious obstacle. 
184. In all, or most of the above, the regional and subregional 
organizations can and should play an active role. It has been observed 
that the necessary organizational infrastructure exists, and it is 
really a matter of making more effective use of it. Much of the 
effort, however, will call for action by individual governments or 
private interests, and for bilateral contacts. 
185. Finally, the CARICOM countries should seek to explore the 
possibilities, given their limited resources, for joint representation 
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in some Hemispheric institutions in order to maximise the capabilities 
available to them. This applies in particular to the smaller countries of the 
group whose external relations apparatus is still limited, and whose 
financial resources often do not permit effective single-state representation. 
The actual form of representation would, of course, be a matter for decision 





SUMMARY OF MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Institutional 
(1) The Caribbean Community States should seek to advance the 
current efforts towards administrative reform of the relationship 
between the ECLA/CDCC Caribbean Office and ECLA, Santiago, by 
establishing a Working Group aimed at revising the substant.ive terms 
of reference of the ECLA/CDCC Caribbean Office, so as to reduce the 
tensions between ECLA-Caribbean and CDCC conceptions of their objectives. 
(2) In this connection the CDCC should be advanced as an 
important facilitator of South-South co-operation between the Caribbean 
countries and the industrialising states of South America. 
(3) The relationship between the CARICOM countries and the Latin 
American States should be facilitated by strengthening the direct 
connections between ECLA/CDCC (Caribbean Office) and the ECLA subregional 
* offices in South and Central America. A main function of the UN/EC'LA 
Headquarters should be to provide the mechanisms and resources for 
achieving this, so that areas of technical and other assistance in Latin 
America of benefit to the Caribbean states can be more easily 
identified and co-ordinated. 
(4) The Working Group established should reflect the interests 
of CARICOM states, other Caribbean states and the UN/ECLA system. 
It should pursue the idea of attaining for the Caribbean Office a 
more autonomous mechanism for funding within the United Nations system. 
(5) CARICOM states might wish to make a collective evaluation 
of their functioning in SELA, with a viev to seeking to emphasize the 
function of this organization in assisting in meeting their needs 
for resources and technical assistance to take advantage of Latin 
American markets, ana as a mechanism for making country-to-country 
and enterprise-to-enterprise links for "industrializing" purposes. 
They should emphasize that SELA's South-South co-operation activities 
should be increased. 
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(6) The CARICOM Secretariat and the ECLA/CDCC Secretariat §he«ld 
jointly undertake an evaluation of Caribbean states' experience of participation 
in NAhUCAR. 
(7) An evaluation should be made of the effect of the Egg/ACP 
relationship on Latin American and Caribbean co-operation. 
(8) An examination should be undertaken on the question of the significance 
of adhering to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) 
by CARICOM states. 
(9) CARICOM states should investigate the possibilities of joint 
representation in certain regional institutions and international institutions 
(e.g. UNESCO) of major relevance to them and which maintain subregional offices 
linking Latin America and the Caribbean. 
(10) The Caribbean states should seek to advance their co-operation in 
relation to the Law of the Sea as it applies to this area, bearing in mind 
the special status of the Caribbean Sea as a semi-enclosed one, in order to 
arrive at a set of community norms comparable to those characterizing the 
Lntin American states. 
B. Other 
(11) CARICOM and Latin American states should further identify areas 
in education, culture and language instruction in which institutional 
arrangements can be made to advance CARICOM countries' understanding of the 
Latin American environment. The efforts of ECLA/CDCC in these areas, as well 
as in the field of documentation should be further financed. 
(12) Co-operation in Science and Technology policy and applications should 
be enhanced. The CDCC mechanisms should be an important facilitator in this 
regard. 
(13) Efforts should be made by Caribbean Governments to further promote 
training of public servants in the principles and practices of the institutions 
of the Inter-American system which are characterized by different legal and 
political principles. The bureaucratic influence of the CARICOM states in these 
organizations is currently too limited. 
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(14) That both ECLA and SELA should be utilised by Governments 
to encourage the development of links between private sector arid statu-
tory institutions within CARICOM countries on the one hepd, g^d those of 
the non-Anglophone countries of the Caribbean gnfj flie gtates pf 
Latin America on the other. 
(15) Consideration should be given to taking advantage of the 
geographical and cultural characteristics of Belize as a "bridging" 
state between the Spanish- and English-speaking countries for the 
establishment of tertiary education facilities concerned with training 
in the Spanish language and culture. 
(16) Efforts should be made to ensure a change in nomenclature 
of the Latin American group in international fora to that of Latin 
America and the Caribbean Group. 
(17) The principle of the 'non-use of force1 in the settlement 
of disputes should be advanced in diplomatic fora by the CARICOM 
states. 
Notes 
1/ CEPAL/CARIB 81/9, Proposed Study of Caribbean/Latin American 
Relations, ECLA Subregional Office for the Caribbean, Port-of-Spain, 
August 1981. 
2/ Economic Relations of Colombia and Venezuela with the 
Caribbean, ECLA Subregional Headquarters for Bogota, Colombia, June 1982 
3/ E/CEPAL/G.1197, Economic Relations of Central America and 
Mexico with the Caribbean, ECLA Subregional Headquarters for Mexico, Apr 
1982. 
4/ George Pendle, A History of Latin America (Penguin Books) 
k. 
i, 
